Partitioning Iraq into Kurdish, Shi'a and Sunni areas is a sensitive subject. It's something most do not want to consider. A sign of the failure of the regime change, it reflects badly on how tolerant society is and raises questions about how transferable western democracy is.
The pragmatic reality though is that the violence has moved Iraq closer to this. 2 million Iraqis have fled the country, and 2.7 million people remain displaced in Iraq (UNAMI 2008).That's 15-20% of the population. Perhaps more significantly, only 17% of IDPs intend to return to their communities of origin (IOM 2008).
Furthermore, this displacement has in part led to a reduction in violence, alleviating the risk of the civil war which Iraq was on the cusp of in 2005/2006. Averting a Sunni-Shiite civil war, which would have significant ramifications for regional dynamics, is surely a potent argument in favour of 'soft participation'.
That said, there are powerful arguments for resisting a 'soft-partition'. It may not be workable. As the recent discussions on Kirkuk have demonstrated, reaching an agreement on control of oil extraction, transportation and processing, and apportioning of oil revenues, would be fraught with challenges. Pursuit of this could itself trigger more violence. Pre-2003, 35% of marriages were mixed. Regional interests may also resist 'soft-partition', e.g. a more autonomous Kurdistan could unnerve Turkey. And the Kurd - Shi'a - Sunni analysis is a gross over-simplification of the ethnic divides, and overlooks the power dynamics that exist on a local level where tribal leaders and militia groups compete for influence and resources. Basra being a great example. Partitioning along the lines of Kurd (north east) - Shi'a (south) - Sunni (centre and west), would be no guarantee of stability and peace.
This whole debate of course overlooks the practical challenges of either option - political systems (whether unitary, decentralised federalism or something else), property and compensation mechanisms, and facilitating population movements (relocation or return).
The pragmatic reality though is that the violence has moved Iraq closer to this. 2 million Iraqis have fled the country, and 2.7 million people remain displaced in Iraq (UNAMI 2008).That's 15-20% of the population. Perhaps more significantly, only 17% of IDPs intend to return to their communities of origin (IOM 2008).
Furthermore, this displacement has in part led to a reduction in violence, alleviating the risk of the civil war which Iraq was on the cusp of in 2005/2006. Averting a Sunni-Shiite civil war, which would have significant ramifications for regional dynamics, is surely a potent argument in favour of 'soft participation'.
That said, there are powerful arguments for resisting a 'soft-partition'. It may not be workable. As the recent discussions on Kirkuk have demonstrated, reaching an agreement on control of oil extraction, transportation and processing, and apportioning of oil revenues, would be fraught with challenges. Pursuit of this could itself trigger more violence. Pre-2003, 35% of marriages were mixed. Regional interests may also resist 'soft-partition', e.g. a more autonomous Kurdistan could unnerve Turkey. And the Kurd - Shi'a - Sunni analysis is a gross over-simplification of the ethnic divides, and overlooks the power dynamics that exist on a local level where tribal leaders and militia groups compete for influence and resources. Basra being a great example. Partitioning along the lines of Kurd (north east) - Shi'a (south) - Sunni (centre and west), would be no guarantee of stability and peace.
This whole debate of course overlooks the practical challenges of either option - political systems (whether unitary, decentralised federalism or something else), property and compensation mechanisms, and facilitating population movements (relocation or return).
No comments:
Post a Comment